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Abstract Open interviews and unplanned conversations with criminals are an
important part of ethnographic research in criminology. This paper presents an
analysis of conversations with members of Russian criminal groups. An attempt is
made to explore the value of these informal interviews, the danger of informal
contacts with criminals, and the reliability of the information received.
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Background of the research project
The first alarm bells on the ‘Red Mafia’ in The Netherlands went off in 1994 when
the Annual Report of the Dutch Secret Service (BVD) issued a serious warning to
Dutch businessmen about to venture into Russia and predicted the Red Mafia’s
arrival in The Netherlands (Jaarverslag BVD 1994). Three years earlier, in 1992, the
body of a murdered Russian had been found in Amsterdam. Allegedly he was the
head of a gang of Russian extortionists operating in Belgium and The Netherlands.
Another early story about the Russian Mafia had come from The Hague in 1994
where the local underworld had kicked a Russian-speaking mob out of the Red Light
district. When the Russians were leaving the scene they left a message behind:
“We’ll be back!” Later it appeared that although they had failed in The Hague,
Russians did succeed in pushing out local criminals from other red light districts,
especially in the south of the country.
With the publication of the BVD report a first official message was formulated:
The Russian Mafia is operating in The Netherlands and presents a threat to the Dutch
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economy and democracy.1 Various reports from other countries, such as the USA,
Germany, England, France and Israel confirmed that there was a potential threat of
activities by the Russian mafia outside the former Soviet Union, particularly in
countries of Western Europe (Varese 2001; Galeotti 1992, 1995; Ruthland and Kogan
1998; Williams 1997). Russian scholars emphasized the transnational character and
‘global’ intentions of the Russian crime organizations, which also contributed to the
idea of a worldwide threat (Gurov 1995; Konstantinov and Dikselius 1997; Dolgova
and Diakov 1996; Gilinskiy 1998, 2000). Russian criminologists and especially
MVD2 officials warned against the potential expansion of the Russian Mafia around
the world, since the Soviet Union was too small a territory for their activities (Gurov
1995; Konstantinov and Dikselius 1997).
These signals from different countries became even more threatening with the
arrival of Russian-speaking immigrants in The Netherlands. After the disappearance
of the Russian Jewish businessman Boris Fastovski in 1995 in Amsterdam the picture
seemed to become even clearer: what was happening in other European countries, was
about to happen here. The Russian mafia was on its way to The Netherlands, perhaps
already active in some places. The wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union
to The Netherlands in the years 1990–1996 and a series of liquidations and other
criminal activities among the Russian speakers gave rise to questions about the link
between the immigrant community and the Russian mafia. Dutch society seemed to be
facing the presence of ‘Russian mafiosi’, not just immigrants who happened to speak
Russian. Various institutions, including the police, the BVD, municipalities, press and
media, financial and commercial organizations in The Netherlands were alarmed
about this new phenomenon. The two main reactions of these institutions were fact
finding and scientific research. In the period between 1996 and 2004, the Dutch
government funded numerous investigations with the purpose of estimating the real
threat of Russian organized crime.
While the press was collecting colorful stories about the bloodthirsty Russian
Mafia, thereby creating a new ‘public problem,’ criminal analysts and the police were
asking questions about numbers, names and types of criminal activities. Statistics were
of little help because of the small numbers of Russian-speaking immigrants in The
Netherlands. However, other data, such as illegal activities or the emergence of new
forms of crime, provided enough material for a series of police reports.3
When taking into account that the Dutch government invested millions of euros in
these police investigations (in 1998 and 1999 about 30 of the best Dutch police
investigators and detectives were employed to find out the truth about the Russian
Mafia), the seriousness of the problem looked even greater. The result was that the image
1 RTL-4 News, 3 April 1995.
2 Ministerstvo Vnutrennich Del (Ministry of Interior).
3 In the period between 1995–1997 the following reports were published: Nulrapportage Oost-Europese
criminaliteit in Nederland (January 1995), Staatscriminaliteit in (Sovjet)—Rusland (January 1995), Post-
Sovjet criminaliteit-een internationale dreiging? (March 1996), Oost-Europese investeringen in Nederland
(March 1996), De Russische Maffia. Nederlandse bedrijven en georganiseerde criminaliteit in Rusland
(A. Jansen, March 1996), Afpersing door Oost-Europeanen (June 1996), Mensenhandel vanuit Centraal-
en Oost-Europa (February 1997), KT NON (Kernteam Noord en Oost Nederland), 1999, Oost-Europese
georganiseerde misdaad: een bedreiging voor Nederland? Nijverdal, KT NON (Kernteam Noord-en Oost-
Nederland), 2000, Algemene Criminaliteitsbeeldanalyze Oost-Europa.
22 Trends Organ Crim (2008) 11:21–29
of the Russian Mafiosi in The Netherlands, already established by the mid-1990s, was
confirmed by these reports: There was a threat and something had to be done. Since the
main suspects of Russian criminal activities were newly arrived immigrants and based
on the international literature regarding the connection between crime and immigrant
groups (Williams 1997; Bovenkerk 2001) the immediate question arose as to the pos-
sible link between the Russian Mafia and the Russian-speaking immigrant community.
The idea of the presence of the Russian mafia in The Netherlands suggested that
one powerful criminal organization, with its headquarters in Moscow, had sent its
agents around the world with the purpose to widen its markets and spheres of
influence. Going across the border implied that the Russian Mafia was a transnational
criminal organization (Williams 1995). The Russian criminals were believed to use
immigrants as partners or clients of these activities, similar to what is happening in
other immigrant criminal situations (see e.g. Bovenkerk 2001). This was the idea,
but what was the reality?
My research was one of many studies conducted during these few years. It was
financed by the WODC—Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek en Documentatie Centrum—
Scientific Research and Documentation Centre at the Dutch Ministry of Justice. But,
while the interest of the institution subsidizing the study was not different from other
organizations, namely estimating the seriousness of the threat of Russian organized
crime in The Netherlands, the purpose of my research had always been more than a
description of organized crime among a group of Russian immigrants, or an analysis of
statistical data. My study dealt with the Russian-speaking immigrants, and more
specifically with questions of how they viewed and explained the activities of the
Russian Mafia in The Netherlands. The main purpose was to understand the phe-
nomenon called ‘Russian Mafia’ as perceived and explained by the Russian-speakers
in The Netherlands themselves. This was actually one of the first attempts to study
Russian organized crime empirically, from inside the community, by analyzing
perceptions and conjectures of Russian speakers on Russian crime and violence in their
midst. While many researchers have dealt with the subject over the last 10 years, none
of them have concentrated on the insights of the Russian-speaking immigrants. They
preferred to use police files, literature and interviews with the relevant officials. Rarely
were the opinions of the Russian-speaking immigrants used as material for analysis
(see Finckenauer and Waring 1998). I focused on the Russian speakers and examined
how they viewed Russian organized crime activities in The Netherlands and what the
differences were between their perceptions and those of the Dutch authorities. There-
fore, informal interviews and conversations were an inevitable part of my fieldwork.
My material derived from my own observations, observations of respondents and
interviews with several criminals in The Netherlands. The data gathering for the
research lasted from March 1999 to March 2001. The core of my fieldwork was
based on almost daily contact with 12 to 14 informants and their families, weekly
meetings with about 16 to 18 others, open conversations (interviews) with 38
Russian-speaking legal immigrants and fourteen illegal immigrants and interviews
with officials from various relevant institutions and organizations.
Although fieldwork is still not the most favored method of research in
criminology, some empirical studies were conducted in this manner. During my
research I came to understand that the results not only produced a supplement to the
existing body of knowledge, but added another reality: the social construction of
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various definitions of Mafia, organized crime and violence and their relevance to
Russians in The Netherlands.
Interviews with the Russian Mafia
In anthropological fieldworks interviews can be viewed as a social situation in which
researcher and informant communicate in a more or less informal context, usually in
the natural setting of the informant. In this regard, such interviews or conversations
are different from the structured or semi-structured interviews used in sociological
research. It can be compared with open interviews, although there are some
differences, namely the spontaneous character and the possibility of unplanned
questions resulting from the participant observation method. Access, setting and trust
are the three most important factors in this context.
Access
Anthropological fieldwork methods, including conversations with criminal inform-
ants, have seldom been used in criminology. To begin with, there is the problem of
access, especially in specific ethnic groups such as the Russians. Researchers have to
be fluent in the language of the ethnic group they are studying or better still: They
have to be ‘one of them.’ In the Russian community this may be difficult, since
anyone who does not speak Russian is a ‘foreigner’ and therefore not to be trusted.
This is a recognized cultural trait of the Russians, because Russians have always
been acutely conscious of the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders,’ and they
have taken this attitude with them wherever they went (Mosking 2001, p. 17). My
Russian background was an advantage in this regard.
Secondly, there is the obstacle of how the informants will react to the subject of
study in hand. It is important to introduce it in a way they understand. Acting on my
existing knowledge of the general ideas about crime and illegality developed in
Russian circles, I introduced myself by telling Russian speakers that I was studying
the Russian business community in The Netherlands. Before approaching Russian-
speaking immigrants with questions, I had to find a way to present myself and the
subject of my study. It seemed clear to me at the time that it would not be possible to
tell them about my interest in the Russian Mafia in The Netherlands. The most likely
reactions would have varied from silence to laughter or jokes (‘Do I look like a
Russian mafioso?’). The next best thing I could think of was to tell my potential
informants that I was writing a book on Russian business in The Netherlands. This
sounded like a very neutral idea; there would not be any focus on specific individual
businessmen or criminal activities. I also decided that I would not ask for official
interviews or even names. The reactions I received came as a surprise:
–‘Oh, you write about business, youmean RussianMafia!’–‘Business?—Youmean
illegal business!’–‘Russian business does not exist—there is only Russian Mafia!’
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My interest in ‘business’ was in many cases reduced by my informants
themselves to ‘illegal business’ or ‘organized crime’ and the murdered businessmen
were often used as examples. Also in my approach to respondents known in Russian
circles as members of criminal groups, I talked only about business, without
mentioning its criminal side.
New contacts were usually established via the snowball method, and I would
either approach the potential respondent myself, or with the assistance and
introduction of other respondents. Sometimes I had to be creative in accessing new
contacts. In one case I first developed a relationship with the girlfriend of a Russian
criminal. I learned that she took her child to the playground in the park on certain
days of the week. I decided to take my sons to play there as well, and the first contact
was created between two mothers instead of between informant and researcher. She
and her boyfriend later became the most important respondents in my whole research.
Settings
Conversations with Russian criminals were part of my fieldwork among the Russian
speakers in The Netherlands, particularly in Amsterdam. Therefore, most of the
conversations were not planned or agreed on in advance. They took place on different
occasions: parties, visits to Russian restaurants, in the park, in shopping malls. Once I
had a conversation with B., a member of a Russian crime organization, in the
Concertgebouw (Concert Hall) in Amsterdam during the performance of a Russian
violin ensemble. I went to the concert with him, his wife, and two other Russian
immigrants, but instead of entering the hall, I spent 2 1/2 h talking with B. in the
vestibule of the Concert Hall. Obviously, he was not interested in the concert itself, and
used the opportunity to escape his wife’s company. For me it was a unique opportunity
to spend time exclusively with B., to ask him questions and to listen to his story.
There were also cases of ‘arranged’ interviews. I asked one of my respondents to
set up a meeting with S., a member of a Baltic criminal group. S. agreed to talk to
me in the lobby of one of the luxury hotels in Amsterdam. We sat in the lobby
drinking coffee in a relaxed atmosphere. I did not use my notebook on S’s request;
we just talked about his life. After a one-hour conversation S. left. When I was on
my way out, I was approached on the staircase by one of the hotel managers who
asked me if I knew that the person I had been talking to was a Russian Mafia boss!
He also asked me whether I was a journalist and if so, not to mention the name of his
hotel to avoid negative publicity. I was later told by other respondents that S. was a
well-known figure in the local Dutch underworld.
Trust
The trust of my informants was vital in building relationships and gathering valuable
information. I always promised discretion. In most cases they saw me as a ‘writer’ or
a university researcher. My informants, who made the connection to cultural values
they held in high esteem (education and erudition), always respected the academic
background of the research. One informant, himself connected to Russian criminal
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groups, used to send me e-mails with Russian media articles on a specific crime boss
(‘for your business book’).
While my efforts to get access and to build trust appeared to be going along
smoothly, and important contacts were established, expectations were created on the
side of the respondents. The main question to arise at this phase was: why do people
talk? The answer was that they were mostly driven by self-interest. When they
provided me with important information, these respondents expected something in
return, for example revenge. They wanted to publish the ‘truth’ about their business
rivals, allegedly involved in illegal activities or connected to criminal organizations.
In these cases, when their purpose became clear to me, I had to be especially careful
with my facts, and check them even more thoroughly than in other cases, in order
not to ruin the reputation of persons involved and to avoid becoming a tool in the
hands of informants with an agenda. Mostly, this kind of information served as a
starting point for further investigations, during which I tried to collect additional
relevant information from other sources. Sometimes, the information was contro-
versial and if I could not get a clear picture I chose to present all possible arguments
from different sources, or to drop the case completely.
Problems
There is a problem of ethical restraint. Some criminologists have ethical objections
to field research among criminals (Sutherland and Cressey 1960, p. 69). Trying to
get closer to informants, however, does not necessarily mean identifying with them. I
often had to deal with the question of ethics. In empirical research, tension can exist
between the need to protect the research population (from violent retaliation, capture,
defamation or privacy intrusion), and the need to inform about harmful or criminal
offences (to other informants or to the police) that come to the knowledge of the
researcher. The information derived from my interviews was no exception. I always
gave priority to protecting informants as long as I was not directly confronted with
serious violent crimes or risks. Luckily I did not experience such extreme situations.
Another reason why fieldwork is not very common in criminology is the problem
of danger. Some criminologists have emphasized that the empirical study of
organized crime is dangerous (e.g. Finckenauer and Waring 1998, p. 7). I never
looked at my informants as dangerous criminals. In this regard, a professional
approach is important: one has to make a distinction between his/her role as a
researcher with a scientific and neutral attitude and as a civilian with morality and
social responsibility. For me criminals were a source of important information and
usually I was grateful to them for sharing this information with me. Therefore, the
‘danger’ aspect of being involved with criminals was not that relevant. However, the
consequences of using information provided by criminals can be unsafe. To avoid
dangerous situations I was always alert to the warnings of my informants. All my
informants were fully aware of the fact that I was writing a book and that many of
our joint activities would be used as ethnographic material. Sometimes I was asked
‘not to mention’ some information, or it was emphasized that something was
confidential or ‘for your ears only.’ In these cases I decided to respect their wishes,
also because of the importance of the relationship of trust with my informants.
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Although I was explicitly looking for cultural interpretations of crime (and this
includes a certain degree of subjectivity per se), one of the problems I faced during my
fieldwork was that my informants often told me different versions of the same event.
In one case, I heard seven different versions and interpretations of a murder story and
the reasons for the victim’s death (from contract killing to leukemia). In another case,
there were different versions regarding the ethnic group the offenders belonged to:
some informants blamed Chechens, others Georgians, one informant mentioned
Turks. In spite of the relationship of trust I had built with my informants, the problem
of getting reliable information remained a constant factor during the fieldwork.
Often informants were unable to tell me whether their specific information was
derived from their own experience, from other people’s stories or from the Dutch
media. Similar problems have been discussed by Finckenauer and Waring in their
study of the Russian Mafia in the USA: ‘it was often difficult for them (Russian
immigrants) to identify where a particular piece of information or an impression had
come from’ (1998, p. 122). In such situations additional sources of information were
vitally important. During my conversations with Russian criminals two specific
methodological problems presented themselves, namely gossip and lies. In many
cases informants simply made up their stories, or invented details. The next day they
would not remember what they had told me the day before. In some cases I felt they
tried to impress me with their expertise and erudition. Sometimes they were simply
lying. This does not mean that their information was irrelevant. On the contrary, I
tried to understand why they lied, and in what cultural context their lies and lack of
trust towards each other should be seen. I wondered whether gossip was really an
obstacle to scientific research or whether it illustrated a specific cultural trait (for
example mutual distrust), or the continuity of a tradition brought from Russia to The
Netherlands, or even more importantly: the manner in which people construct reality.
This is why I will now focus briefly on lies and gossip, not only as an obstacle, but
also as a source of information which can provide an additional explanation to the
issue of how my informants arrived at certain perceptions of reality.
According to some authors, the Soviet people have maintained a ‘tradition of
lying’ during the seventy years of the Soviet regime: ‘People easily protect their
private life because they are forced to lie regularly in their professional work, faking
reports on their production activity, pretending to fulfil orders, and participating each
day in the various rituals’ (Shlapentoch 1989, p. 159). This explanation emphasizes
the continuity, but it does not explain the reason why the lies persisted after 1991, or
why citizens of the former Soviet Union would still be lying in a totally different
country and social environment.
Gossip as a way of communication is more common. In a moral sense gossiping
is considered a negative, but criminologists have found that it can play a functional
role in uniting people and in the exertion of social control. According to Paine
‘...sometimes a good gossiper plans on certain of his “confidences” being passed
on; at other times the social costs to him of a leakage would be disastrous’ (1967,
p. 283). By gossiping one is able to manipulate the construction of specific images or
ideas. In one case a former partner of G., a dubious Russian businessman, spread the
rumor that G. was ‘mixing with some suspicious guys’, with the clear purpose of
spoiling his reputation in Russian circles, and especially among his clients. In another
case, the wife of V., another Russian businessman, told me that she almost divorced
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him, when ‘a good friend’ told her that there were rumors of V. using his extended
business trips to Russia as an excuse to stay with his mistress. As V. found out later,
the gossiper was one of his former clients, who had promised to ‘punish him’ for not
living up to a business contract. In these cases gossip created a lack of trust, but also
valuable information on competitors and rivals. This led me to conclude that although
rumors and lies can be an obstacle to gathering information, they still play an
important role in the process of the respondents’ self-identification and construction of
images. In a scientific analysis gossip and lies should not be neglected as ‘unusable
material.’ On the contrary, they can provide us with more insight and a deeper
understanding of the cultural construction of images of crime among Russian speakers
in The Netherlands.
Value of interviews
The question I often asked myself during my research was whether I could obtain the
same data and results by using alternative research methods, such as analyzing police
files or interviewing prisoners, but the answer must be negative. In files or interviews
detainees tend to present only information they consider to be in their own interest: to
get released from prison or to be found not guilty. This type of data can never provide
us with much insight into motives, background, the informants’ context and networks,
or the ‘essence’ of the crime committed. Moreover, crime consists of more than facts
and numbers: ‘crime is as much about emotions, hatred, anger, frustration, excitement
and love—as it is about poverty, possessing and wealth’ (Presdee 2004, p. 4). In
conversations with criminals these important factors are present and can be studied.
This is particularly valuable for a better understanding of the motives and perceptions
of crime as explained by the informants themselves.
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